INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's landmark decision in Citizens United v. FEC 1 provided corporations with the highest level of First Amendment speech protection, at least in the context of election-related speech. 2 On its face, this strong level of protection would seem to throw into doubt the speech-related restrictions federal tax law imposes on charities, including the limits on lobbying.
3 First, the effect of the Citizens United holding on the lobbying limits for charities is unclear because of the Supreme Court's identification of a government subsidy -in the form of tax benefits -in the charity context.
There are, however, at least two reasons to believe this conclusion is incorrect. 4 Second, the Court's related decision to conclude that a charity's First Amendment rights are sufficiently vindicated by the ability ** Associate Professor, Notre Dame Law School; Of Counsel, Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered. I am very grateful to the National Center on Philanthropy and the Law for the opportunity to present this paper, to Ellen Aprill and Rick Garnett for helpful comments, and to Paul Krog for research assistance. 1 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010) . 2 See id. at 930 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The conceit that corporations must be treated identically to natural persons in the political sphere is not only inaccurate but also inadequate to justify the Court's disposition of this case."); see, e.g., Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/01/analysis-the-personhood-of-corporations/ (Jan. 21, 2010, 18:45 EST) ("If anything, the decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission conferred new dignity on corporate 'persons,' treating them -under the First Amendment free-speech clause -as the equal of human beings."); Posting of Doug Kendall to The Huffington Post (Jan. 21, 2010, 16:27 EST) ("the Court's conservative majority re-wrote the Constitution to give corporations . . . the same right to influence the electoral process as 'We the People'"); Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, A Bad Call on Campaign Finance, CNN, Jan. 21, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/01/21/torres.spelliscy.supreme.court.campaign.finance/ (Citizens United "granted corporations the same speech rights enjoyed by living, breathing persons"). 3 See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006) (as a condition for exemption from federal income tax, limiting entities organized and operated for charitable, educational, or other listed purposes with respect to both attempting to influence legislation and participating in political campaigns); id. § 170(c)(2)(D) (2006) (same limitations on the same types of entities as a condition for eligibility to receive tax deductible charitable contributions). 4 See Taxation with Representation v. Regan, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983) .
to speak through the alternate channel of a non-charitable affiliate further complicates the analysis. 5 At the same time, however, these complications provide grounds for considering whether a more nuanced, "institutional rights" approach to First Amendment speech protection is appropriate in this context of lobbying by charities and perhaps also in other "subsidy" contexts. 6 Part I of this article briefly reviews both the federal tax law limits on lobbying by charities and the Supreme Court's basis for concluding that the limits are constitutional.
Part II then reviews the Citizens United decision and why that decision is unlikely to have an immediate effect on the viability of those limits. Finally, Part III considers how both the Citizens United decision and a broader institutional rights perspective may instead affect the ability of the federal government to restrict the relationships between charities and their non-charitable affiliates that engage in lobbying, as well as affecting other contexts where the government places speech-related conditions on the provision of government subsidies.
I. CHARITIES AND LOBBYING
There is long history of charitable organizations engaging in efforts to shape public policy, including through attempting to influencing legislation. That said there is almost as long a history of the law limiting such attempts. This part reviews both those limits and the court challenges to them.
A. Limits on Charity Lobbying
To understand the limits on lobbying by charities requires defining "charity" and "lobbying," as well exploring how charities engage in advocacy even with these limits in place. 5 See id. at 544 n.6, 553-54 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 6 See, e.g., Randall P. 
Definitions
For purposes of this discussion, a "charity" is a legal entity that both is exempt from federal income tax because it is described in Internal Revenue Code section 501(c) (3) and is eligible to receive tax deductible charitable contributions because it is described in Code section 170(c)(2). 7 Charities are therefore a subset of the category "tax-exempt" or "exempt" organizations, which category includes all organizations that are exempt from federal income tax whether or not eligible to receive tax deductible charitable contributions. 8 Examples of non-charity exempt organizations include unions, trade associations, and the recently created nonprofit health insurance provider option. 9 Taxexempt organizations are in turn a subset of the category "nonprofit" or "not-for-profit"
organizations, which category includes all entities that under state law do not have owners with a right to the distribution of profits whether or not exempt from federal income tax.
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The term "lobbying" as used by the federal tax law with respect to charities is attempting "to influence legislation" 11 although, as detailed later in this section, federal tax law actually provides two overlapping but different definitions of attempting to influence legislation. 12 Lobbying therefore generally includes any attempt, direct or indirect, to affect a bill, resolution, decree, or other action by a legislative body, as well as any attempt to affect a ballot initiative, referendum, or constitutional amendment that is subject to public vote. These definitions therefore do not treat as lobbying any communications with executive branch officials (unless aimed at influencing legislation), litigation or other interactions with judicial branch officials, or education of the public about policy issues (unless such education is an indirect attempt to influence legislation). 8 See I.R.C. § 501(a), (c) (West 2010). 9 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(5), (6), (29) (West 2010 
Limits
As others have detailed, the limits on lobbying by charities is essentially a story of "charity good" (insert picture of charity leader with halo and wings here), "lobbying bad"
(insert picture of lobbyist with horns and a pitchfork here), and therefore (too much) lobbying by charities is bad. 14 After the enactment of the Internal Revenue Code, the first Charities struggled against these limits, especially as government activity in areas of concern to them grew. Some organizations lost their charitable status as a result, most prominently the Sierra Club. 21 Others sought a liberalization of the existing limits, an effort that was partially successful when Congress in 1976 enacted an elective regime under which charities would be subject to a specific dollar limit on their lobbying as opposed to the vague and uncertain substantial part standard. 22 After some controversy, the Treasury Department also issued regulations that provided very specific and relatively narrow definitions of what constituted "direct" and "grassroots" lobbying for charities that made this election, further freeing them from the limits.
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Nevertheless, many charities continue to seek a loosening of these limits. For example, the Center for Lobbying in the Public Interest has long taken the position that these rules should be liberalized to make it easier for charities to be involved politically.
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The possibility that newspapers and other news outlets may seek refuge in charity status could also put new pressure on these limits. Current law does, however, offer a way for charities to lobby without limit. That way is to create an affiliated, non-charity that while not eligible to receive tax deductible contributions also is not subject to the lobbying limits imposed on charities. The next section addresses the rules and burdens associated with having such an affiliate.
Non-Charitable Affiliates
The IRS has historically permitted charities to create closely affiliated non- The actual burden imposed on a charity by having to create a non-charitable affiliate to engage in substantial lobbying is important because of the constitutional issues raised by the limits on charity lobbying. Those issues arise because the federal government is conditioning receipt of a benefit -the ability to receive tax deductible charitable contributions -on surrendering the constitutionally protected right to speak with respect to certain subjects, as detailed in the next section.
B. Constitutionality of Those Limits
To understand both why the limits on lobbying by charities raises a constitutional issue, and why -at least before Citizens United -the limits ultimately survive constitutional scrutiny, requires consideration of the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine and its specific application to these limits.
The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is deceptively simple. It provides that the government cannot do indirectly what it could not do directly. 35 One of the clearest examples of such a situation involved the denial of exemption from tax, although not from federal income tax but from state property tax. In Speiser v. Randall, California assessors denied a property-tax exemption to two veterans based solely on the fact that the veterans refused to execute a loyalty oath contained in the exemption application. 36 While the assessors argued that the exemption was a "privilege" or "bounty" and so its denial could not infringe speech, presumably since the veterans only had to reject the benefit to be free of the oath, the Court felt otherwise. although it has indicated that the doctrine still has merit. 44 Courts therefore continue to have to struggle with the application of this doctrine in situations ranging from the legalizing prostitution example provided above to the provision of legal services to the poor. 45 One area where the courts have provided relatively clarity, however, is with respect to the limits on lobbying by charities.
Are the Limits on Charity Lobbying an Unconstitutional Condition?
The lobbying limits on charities, as well the prohibition on charities intervening in political campaigns, would seem to be ripe for an unconstitutional condition challenge.
Here we have Congress doing indirectly something it clearly could not do directly -forbid a particular type of organization from engaging in a specific type of speech -absent a sufficiently strong interest for doing so (although how strong would depend on the level of protection provided to this type of speaker engaging in this type of speech, an issue that will be considered later). At the very least it therefore seems that Congress should have to provide a sufficiently strong justification for this condition on the ability to receive tax deductible charitable contributions to overcome the free speech concerns it raises.
When presented with this issue, however, the Supreme Court found it relatively easy to uphold the lobbying limits. To understand why, we have to start with a decision In that case, the Supreme Court found that both tax exemption and deductible As the Bellotti decision indicates, the Court's focus on speech and not the speaker was not completely new, but the Citizens United decision appeared to take it to its logical extreme. Even the hedging with respect to certain speaker characteristics could be read as simply a concession that in those instances the government might have a stronger case for regulation of candidate-related speech because the combating corruption or appearance of corruption interest -even read narrowly -might be particularly strong in these instances.
There was no suggestion in the opinion, however, that differential treatment of nonprofit organizations generally, or charities specifically, is permitted constitutionally. There are, however, two reasons why the Citizens United decision could still impact the limits on lobbying by charities. The first reason is simply that it is difficult if not impossible to predict the likely ramifications of this decision so soon after its issuance.
B. Likely Immediate Effect on Charity Lobbying Limits
Not only its holding but its reasoning will provide fodder for legal challenges and court decisions for many years, and it would be an impossible task to be accurate in predicting all of its possible ramifications or even all of its implications in this particular area. concluding that in the context of charities using non-deductible funds to support lobbying the answer to this question is yes. Only after consideration of these threshold issues can the impact of Citizens United on charities and lobbying be accurately evaluated.
A. Threshold Issues
There two threshold issues relating to Citizens United are the extent to which the First Amendment protects speech by institutions, as opposed to individuals, and, if such protection exists, whether it extends to the use of money to support such speech.
Is Speech by Institutions Protected?
The language of the Court's opinion in Citizens United could leave the impression that protection of institutional speech is an all-or-nothing proposition: either that speech has the full protection of the First Amendment, or it is deserving of no such protection. to be heard -and because it would undermine the freedom of association under the First Amendment.
It appears that the charities most likely to be affected by the current lobbying limits are those akin to the MCFLs of the world for two reasons. First, charities that are most similar to for-profit businesses in that they rely heavily on fees as opposed to contributions for their financial support are unlikely to bump up against the limits because such charities -e.g., colleges, universities, and other schools; hospitals and health care entities; child care centers; retirement communities -focus the vast majority of their activities on providing the services for which they are paid. Whatever lobbying they engage in is therefore almost certainly going to be an insubstantial part of their activities or, if they have made the election to be subject to the alternate expenditure limits, comfortably below those limits since they are based on a sliding scale tied to overall exempt purpose expenditures. Council and the NRDC Action Fund. 100 The IRS has itself noticed this trait. 
Is Money Speech?
A second threshold issue is whether whatever level of protection exists constitutionally for institutional speech extends to speech-related spending by institutions.
The question can be divided into two parts. First, there is spending that pays for speech, in that the speech would not occur at the same volume or effectiveness absent the spending.
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Second, there is the more controversial assertion that the very act of spending can itself be speech. The most significant but not universally accepted example of such speech is campaign contributions, where the very act of making a contribution to the candidate or political party of one's choice could be viewed as speech, and not merely as a means of facilitating speech by the recipient. Such spending is currently deemed by the Supreme One of the simplest examples of the former role of money is buying a megaphone -the speech could still occur without the megaphone, but it will be heard by a larger audience if the speaker can spend money on amplification. As for the latter role, consider the difference between a message crafted by an individual and one crafted by an experienced public relations firm. Again, the speech occurs in either instance, but the ability to hire the firm will usually enhance the speech's effectiveness.
Court to have less protection than spending on the spender's own speech, however, if only because while the act of contributing is deemed to have substantial expressive value, the amount of a contribution is deemed to have significantly less such speech-related value (and so less protection).
Whatever the merit or lack thereof of the second issue, for the limitation on charities engaging in lobbying it is the first issue that is key. There is no doubt that lobbying, as well as other forms of advocacy, is facilitated by the ability to spend.
Furthermore, the actual cost of lobbying will vary depending on whether pre-tax or posttax funds must be used. The effect of the existing limits on charity lobbying, along with certain other federal tax provisions relating to lobbying, is, for the most part, to require the use of post-tax funds for such activity. 
B. Alternate Channels: Charities and Lobbying and Beyond
As noted previously, the greatest constitutional issue raised by the Citizens United decision for the charity lobbying limits is the Court's strongly worded dismissal of the government's argument that the ability to form a political committee or PAC provided a sufficient alternate channel for Citizen United's speech. While not directly on point because of the lack of a subsidy, the holding in Citizens United strongly suggests that the burden on the ability of a charity or other group to speak using non-subsidized funds must be minimal if strict scrutiny applies. For the reasons already discussed, even if one disagrees with Citizens United general holding regarding the level of protection provided to institutional speech generally, there are strong arguments for concluding that the highest level of protection applies to most charities that will run up against the lobbying limits. These positions lead to the ultimate conclusion that all the government can require consistent with the First Amendment is the degree of separation between the charity and its non-charitable affiliate sufficient to ensure the subsidy will not flow to the speech at issue, but no more. Even if a PAC could somehow allow a corporation to speak -and it does notthe option to form PACs does not alleviate the First Amendment problems with § 441b. PACs are burdensome alternatives; they are expensive to administer and subject to extensive regulations. For example, every PAC must appoint a treasurer, forward donations to the treasurer promptly, keep detailed records of the identities of the persons making donations, preserve receipts for three years, and file an organization statement and report changes to this information within 10 days.
And that is just the beginning. PACs must file detailed monthly reports with the FEC, which are due at different times depending on the type of election that is about to occur: These reports must contain information regarding the amount of cash on hand; the total amount of receipts, detailed by 10 different categories; the identification of each political committee and candidate's authorized or affiliated committee making contributions, and any persons making loans, providing rebates, refunds, dividends, or interest or any other offset to operating expenditures in an aggregate amount over $200; the total amount of all disbursements, detailed by 12 different categories; the names of all authorized or affiliated committees to whom expenditures aggregating over $200 have been made; persons to whom loan repayments or refunds have been made; the total sum of all contributions, operating expenses, outstanding debts and obligations, and the settlement terms of the retirement of any debt or obligation.
PACs have to comply with these regulations just to speak. This might explain why fewer than 2,000 of the millions of corporations in this country have PACs. PACs, furthermore, must exist before they can speak. Given the onerous restrictions, a corporation may not be able to establish a PAC in time to make its views known regarding candidates and issues in a current campaign. Section 441b's prohibition on corporate independent expenditures is thus a ban on speech.
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This argument strengthens the position that the measures required to prevent such subsidies from funding certain speech must not substantially burden the ability of the same association of individuals to use non-subsidized funds for such speech. whether such disclosure and administrative obligations might, at some point, become unconstitutionally burdensome.
C. Ramifications Beyond the Federal Tax Rules
As noted previously, the holding in Taxation More fundamentally, Citizens United may provide a catalyst for renewed consideration of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine not only in the charity speech context but in the subsidy situation more broadly. Such renewed consideration is far from certain, but the continued confusion over when a condition that infringes on constitutional rights -particularly the right to free speech -is unconstitutional indicates that such consideration is still needed. One possible approach would be to consider whether the underlying purpose of the subsidy should be the controlling factor, with the constitutionality of the speech-related condition turning on whether that condition is necessary for accomplishing that purpose.
Such an approach would have potentially broad ramifications, including to the charity lobbying context. The question in that context would become whether the purpose for the charitable contribution deduction would be frustrated by permitting charities to engage in unlimited lobbying. Indeed, there is a strong case to be made that it was exactly this concern that motivated Congress when it enacted the initial charity lobbying limit, because the legislative history indicates that Congress felt charity lobbying could be co-opted by private interests and serving private interests is fundamentally at odds with the public benefitting nature of the organizations Congress has identified as eligible for deductible charitable contributions. 123 The problem with the limit as enacted, however, is that it goes well beyond this private interest concern. Moreover, the subsequent development of the private benefit doctrine indicates that the blunt instrument of a general lobbying limitation is not needed to address this private interest concern. What Citizens United may change is the extent to which the government may burden the ability to create that alternate channel beyond what is absolutely necessary to ensure financial separation. While the IRS has historically been careful to keep that burden light, its position has arguably been primarily a pragmatic one designed to avoid constitutional litigation that it might lose but that would certainly require significant resources it could more productively use elsewhere. Now, however, the risk of such a loss appears to be significantly increased. Moreover, both some of its current positions and congressional proposals that would impose additional burdens may also be constitutionally problematic.
Finally, this line of argument suggests that other, non-tax cases that raise similar issues also be impacted by Citizens United. Again, the presence of a government subsidy still appears to permit the government to dictate what speech may -and may not -be funded by that subsidy. The requirements the government may impose in the name of achieving this goal may be subject to a greater constitutional scrutiny, however.
Furthermore, Citizens United may trigger further consideration of whether the unconstitutional conditions doctrine can be successfully refined in the subsidy context.
One of the ramifications of Citizens United may therefore have been to bring even greater clarity to this one corner of the otherwise murky unconstitutional conditions world.
